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Introduction 1
Introduction 
 
The following report provides an overview of a Home Value Protection (HVP) product to 
evaluate the practicality of making such a program more widely available and provide 
background for anyone considering such a plan.  The paper is based largely on the Home Value 
Protection product established in Syracuse New York in 2002, and a number of the authors of 
this paper participated in the establishment of the Syracuse Home Value Protection program.   
 
The paper contains four sections:  
 
1- Investor Outreach  
This section provides background information about the Syracuse program, the current 
and potential participants and what roles they might play, a review of a few of the ways 
such a program could be implemented, and links to various media coverage.  
 
2- Index Research 
The Syracuse program measured changes in house values by a real estate index for the 
area (rather than individual house sale price), and this section evaluates a number of 
different index methods using four markets historical data to see how well the different 
indexes would have performed with a HVP product (had it been available).   
 
3- Capital Requirements & Pricing 
This section provides a model for estimating the pricing requirements and capital 
required for a program across multiple markets.  While not exhaustive, this approach will 
provide a useful reference and starting point for anyone evaluating investment in such a 
program. 
 
4- Regulatory Environment 
This section provides information on some of the regulatory entities across the markets 
used in the analysis.  Due to the variations in the way a HVP product could be 
implemented, regulations could apply in a variety of ways and this section can only offer 
a starting point for potential investors or participants.  
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1.0 Investor Outreach 
1.1 Home Value Protection- Concept Overview 
• Offer new or existing homeowners a product to insure against a decrease in local 
home prices. 
• Opportunity for insurer to pool and diversify risk across regions. 
• Potential profitable product offering. 
• Potential tool for addressing depressed housing markets. 
1.2 Syracuse Program Summary 
• Beginning in 2002, a HVP product was offered in Syracuse New York, through a 
local non-profit, Home Headquarters Inc (HHQ)1 
• Fee: Homeowner pays a one-time 1.5% fee as a percentage of the value protected. 
• Index: Uses a Real Estate Price Index to capture localized trends.  Index avoids the 
need to track individual sale and resale prices and mitigates the impact of property 
maintenance/upkeep issues.  
1.2.1 Syracuse Homeowners/Customers 
• 75 homeowners protecting over $5 million in home value. 
1.2.2 Syracuse Distributor/Retailer 
• Widely credited by Realtors® and local stakeholders as strongly contributing to price 
appreciation in the Syracuse market. 
• Strong interest among lenders, in the financial press, and from other cities. 
• Functions independently of the mortgage market. 
• More recently, Bank of America, HSBC, and M&T Bank have offered to pay portions 
of HVP premiums for homeowners who use their mortgage services. 
1.2.3 Syracuse Insurer/Risk Holder 
• Nonprofit risk holder. 
• Mix of public and private investments provide backstop capital beyond the fees paid 
by homeowners. 
• Lender is loss payee but receives no payout after a foreclosure. 
1.2.4 Syracuse Government Agency/Non Government Organizations 
• $5 Million in HUD funding for program reserves. 
• Operated by local non-profit and supported by local government organizations. 
1.2.5 Syracuse Example: 
• A homeowner has a $100,000 property and purchases HVP. 
• Pricing of HVP is 1.5% of purchase value ($1,500). 
• 5 years later they sell; the house price index has declined 10%.  
• The homeowner receives an insurance payout of $10,000. (10% x $100,000) 
                                                 
1 With assistance from Syracuse Neighborhood Initiative (SNI), NeighborWorks® America, Yale School of 
Management, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and other local government supporters. 
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• Had the zip code home price index increased, there would be no payment. 
• This payout is not dependent on the purchase or sales price of the home, but rather 
index based.  (It is therefore possible to receive payout along with a profitable sale if 
the local index has decreased.) 
1.3 HVP - Potential Participants 
• There are a number of reasons various parties may be interested in participating in the 
launch of a HVP program in their area.  The following sections review the four major 
roles and the possible benefits to each. 
1.3.1 Homeowners/Customers 
• National survey suggests a significant proportion of homebuyers might consider 
buying HVP, despite the newness of the product. 
• May be highly leveraged and willing to pay to protect against the risk of housing 
devaluation. 
• Potential customers could range from low-income first-time buyers to very 
sophisticated, high-end buyers. 
• Such insurance reduces likelihood of subsequent mortgage default. 
o If prices appreciate/hold steady  Æ  Sell and repay mortgage 
o If prices depreciate  Æ Sell, claim HVP, repay mortgage 
1.3.2 Distributor/Retailer 
• Transaction services with sales and marketing support.  Some degree of coordination 
with existing, related settlement processes- realtors, settlement agents, etc. 
• Possible financing of HVP premium internally or with additional participant. 
• Supporting HVP may support CRA Lending efforts. 
• Interest from financial services firms in offering such a product to their customers.   
1.3.3 Insurer/Risk Holder 
• An opportunity exists for an organization to insure the product and capture profitable 
returns through risk pooling. 
• Opportunity to capture portion of these savings as increased profit for insurer. 
• The opportunity now also exists to lay off risk through the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange’s Home Price Futures market 
1.3.4 Government Agency/Non Government Organizations 
• Many Federal, State, and Local organizations have social mission involving 
homeownership and may be willing or interested in supporting such a product. 
• A number of city governments and non-profits have expressed interest in the 
Syracuse program and may be receptive to facilitating similar programs. 
• Such programs address three hot community development themes: wealth building, 
urban revitalization, and weak markets. 
1.4 Potential Participants- For Profit/Financial Institutions 
There are a variety of ways profit-making organizations might want to participate in a 
Home Value Protection product.  Because there are a range of stakeholders in the 
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industry space and in specific transactions, there exist numerous possible interested 
parties, and their approach would impact the appeal from other stakeholders.   
1.4.1 Large Financial Organizations  
• Large Financial entities may be interested in a HVP product as a component of their 
product offerings to expand the ways they are able to serve their customers.   
• Such organizations may be particularly well suited to diversify regional risk by 
offering the product across different regions, though multi-regional trends would  be 
more difficult to manage through diversification. 
1.4.2 Retail Mortgage Companies 
• Retail Mortgage companies may be interested in a HVP product as a compliment to 
their existing mortgage products as a way to expand their product offerings. 
• As they are involved in the closing process when properties are bought and sold, 
retail mortgage companies already have an infrastructure they may be able to leverage 
in supporting HVP transactions. 
1.4.3 Mortgage Insurance Companies 
• Mortgage Insurance companies may be interested in a HVP product as a way to 
expand their existing and related mortgage insurance products.  As mortgage 
insurance covers the risk that the mortgagee defaults, part of that risk is related to the 
value of the underlying asset.  Since HVP is focused on the risk related to the asset 
itself, by adding HVP to a mortgage insurance product, these companies may be able 
to offer enhanced products to their customers.   
• In a way similar to the Retail Mortgage companies, the Mortgage Insurance industry 
already participates in the closing process for real estate transactions and could 
leverage this if it were to participate. 
1.4.4 Insurance or Reinsurance Companies 
• In a number of ways, HVP has elements in common with insurance products, though 
it can certainly be implemented in a way that distinguishes it from traditional 
insurance.   Because of the conceptual commonalities, insurance (or re-insurance) 
companies may be well positioned to diversify and hedge the risk that exists in 
supporting the required capital for a HVP product.   
1.5 Potential Participants - Non Profit/Community Development 
1.5.1 National Level Government 
• Supporting housing markets and serving homeowners who may be exposed to 
increased risk, particularly if they represent more vulnerable populations, may be of 
interest to the Federal Government. 
• The US Department of Housing and Urban Development participated in the HVP 
program in Syracuse New York by providing a grant to support the capital 
requirements. 
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1.5.2 Local or State Government 
• Beyond the general national perspective, specific local areas may face housing 
challenges that would make HVP a particularly attractive product.  As in the example 
case of Syracuse New York, local governments (with their non-government partners) 
can use HVP to assist in depressed areas. 
1.5.3 National Associations or Other Non-Profits 
• Other groups may represent various interests from community groups to coalitions of 
the stakeholders described above who may have an interest in HVP products. 
• Nonprofits could directly offer an HVP product at the neighborhood or citywide 
level.  These products might be priced below expected costs and use subsidy funding 
to enhance the attractiveness of the neighborhood to potential homebuyers. 
1.6 Outreach Channels 
• Because such a product would impact a variety of stakeholders, it would be desirable 
to communicate the potential program applications in a number of channels:  
o Mortgage Related Publications 
o Business Press 
o Popular media and newspapers 
1.7 Business Press and Resources 
1.7.1 Business Press and Research Articles 
• Money Magazine: Bubble Proof Your Home (March 2004) 
  http://www.money.cnn.com/2004/02/20/pf/yourhome/freeintro_real_estate_bubbleproof_0403 
• Wall Street Journal: For Some Buyers, a Nice Hedge (Feb 2004) 
  http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107576833273118663,00.html (subscription required) 
• Forbes Magazine: Price Protect your Home (August 2002) 
  http://www.forbes.com/columnists/2002/08/28/0829whynot.html 
• Worth Magazine: Safe as Houses (January 2005) 
  http://www.worth.com/Editorial/Family-Finances/Risk-Review/Real-Estate-Safe-as-Houses.asp 
• Research Paper: Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot Project (May 2003) 
  http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=410141 
1.7.2 Related Organizations and URLs 
• Syracuse Neighborhood Initiative www.syracusesni.org 
• NeighborWorks® America www.nw.org 
• Home Headquarters, Syracuse NY www.homehq.org 
• Yale School of Management http://icf.som.yale.edu/research/Homeequity.shtml 
• Housing Price Hedge Products http://www.hedgestreet.com/hedgelets 
2- Index Research 5
2.0 Home Price Index Research 
2.1 Summary 
A central challenge in the development of an index-based Home Value Protection 
program is the selection of an appropriate index.  A desirable index for an HVP program 
would cover much (ideally, all) of the losses that homeowners face that are due to forces 
outside their control.   It would also not cover any losses due to forces within the 
homeowners control (e.g. deferred maintenance to the home, overpaying for the home, 
etc), so that the total payouts of the HVP program (and therefore the premiums charged to 
homeowners) were kept at a minimum.  Any evaluation of index performance, however, 
is limited somewhat by the ability to determine what component of any loss a homeowner 
experienced was due to forces outside of his or her control, especially using summary 
records of historical home transactions.   
 
This paper presents an analysis of the performance of several home prices indices in 
predicting the actual losses faced by homeowners, utilizing index histories and repeat 
sales data for four cities: Buffalo NY, New Haven CT, Los Angeles CA, and Oklahoma 
City OK. The home price indices tested are the OFHEO MSA-level repeat sales House 
Price Index (HPI), and median price indices constructed from the repeat sales data. 
 
In general, the OFHEO repeat sales index appeared to provide a serviceable and lower-
cost hedge for homeowners in most of the cities, though this index does have limitations.  
Median prices indices generally provided slightly better coverage against losses, but they 
also had higher payouts overall and therefore would have been more costly to provide.  A 
significant exception occurred in Buffalo, where neither citywide median price indices 
nor the OFHEO index provided good coverage by any measure of performance.  A ZIP 
code median price index created for Buffalo performed better, but was also significantly 
more costly. 
 
No one of the price indices tested emerged as a 
clearly superior option for all situations.  This 
result is somewhat challenging for efforts to 
establish a multiple city program based on the 
same index.  A program based on the OFHEO 
index would provide a measurable level of 
protection for customers in many situations, and 
would be relatively inexpensive to provide.  
However, it would be very important for 
homeowners to be aware that there are many 
components of house price risk which the OFHEO index simply does not cover.  Indices 
that measure house price changes in smaller geographic areas, if their efficiency can be 
improved, would be an important tool for HVP programs.  The FiServ/CSW repeat sales 
index may be one such possibility, and should be tested. 
Index Evaluation 
Effectiveness: Coverage of losses 
experienced (HVP Payout to those 
with losses / Actual Losses) 
Efficiency: Portion of Payouts going to 
people actually experiencing a loss. 
(HVP Payout to those with losses / 
All Payouts) 
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2.2 Introduction 
Home Value Protection (HVP) programs offer the promise of helping low- and moderate-
income homeowners to protect their assets in the event of home price declines. 
Depending on how the protection is provided, HVP may also help to attract and retain 
homeowners in neighborhoods at any income level where there is a concern that property 
values might decline.   
 
Early HVP programs (called “equity assurance”) in Chicago and elsewhere provided a 
guarantee that homeowners would be able to resell their home for at least as much as they 
bought it for, or they would be reimbursed the difference.  This approach required 
substantial and costly mechanisms to ensure that homeowners adequately maintained 
their home, did not overpay for it upon purchase, and obtained the maximum possible 
sales price in the market. 
 
Shiller and Weiss proposed the use of home price indices in HVP programs as a way of 
eliminating this moral hazard problem.2  With this approach, homeowners are paid based 
on the decline in a home price index.  For example, in the Syracuse HVP program, a 
homeowner specifies the value of their home they wish to protect and pays a one-time 
premium as a percentage of that value.  At the time the home is resold, if there has been a 
decline in the home price index, the HVP program pays the homeowner the protected 
value of their home times the decline in the home price index.  If a homeowner protects a 
$100,000 home, and at the time of resale, the price index has dropped by 10%, HVP 
would pay 10% of $100,000 or $10,000.  Since the payout is not dependent on the actual 
resale price of the home, no moral hazard problem exists.  The homeowner has all the 
same incentives they would without HVP to maintain the home and sell it for the best 
price possible.  Even if they sell the home at a gain, they may still receive a payout from 
HVP if the index has gone down. 
 
A central challenge in the development of index-based Home Value Protection program 
is the selection of an appropriate index.  A desirable index for an HVP program would 
cover much (ideally, all) of the losses that homeowners face that are due to forces outside 
their control.   It would also not cover any losses due to forces within the homeowners 
control (e.g. deferred maintenance to the home, overpaying for the home, etc), so that the 
total payouts of the HVP program (and therefore the premiums charged to homeowners) 
were kept at a minimum.  Any evaluation of index performance, however, is somewhat 
limited by the ability to determine what component of any loss a homeowner experienced 
was due to forces outside of his or her control, especially using summary records of 
historical home transactions.   
 
This paper presents an analysis of the performance of several home prices indices in 
predicting the actual losses faced by homeowners, utilizing index histories and repeat 
sales data for four cities: Buffalo NY, New Haven CT, Los Angeles CA, and Oklahoma 
City OK.   The home price indices tested are the OFHEO MSA-level repeat sales House 
Price Index (HPI), and median price indices constructed from the repeat sales data. 
                                                 
2 Shiller, Robert, and Alan Weiss (1998).  Moral Hazard in Home Equity Conversion.  Presented at AREUEA–
ASSA session, January 4, 1998, Chicago Illinois. 
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2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Obtaining and Creating Indices for Testing 
 
We tested the following indices: 
• OFHEO- MSA:  The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 
produces a repeat sales House Price Index (HPI) for Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA).  Multiple sales of the same property are loaded into a regression 
analysis that estimates the growth in house prices by quarter.  The OFHEO index 
is an attractive candidate for HVP programs since it is produced by a federal 
government entity, reducing the cost of index provision while enhancing the 
credibility of the program.  OFHEO has a detailed paper on its website discussing 
the methodology by which its index is produced (www.ofheo.gov). 
• Median Price - City Wide (Rolling, Quarterly):  We also obtained actual home 
sales data for the study cities (Buffalo, New Haven, Los Angeles, and Oklahoma 
City) and used this data to create simple median price indices measuring the 
citywide change in prices (as opposed to MSA-wide for OFHEO).  One median 
price index simply took the median of all homes sold in each quarter – we refer to 
this as the quarterly median price index.  Another median price index we created 
took the median, each month, of the previous 12 months of sales.  We refer to this 
index as the rolling annual median index. 
• Median Price - Zip Code:  In the case of Buffalo, we also created median price 
indices for each ZIP code in the city, providing a greater level of geographic 
refinement. 
Data for the creation of the median price indices came from different sources in each city: 
• In Oklahoma City, we used single sales transactions data provided by the 
Oklahoma County Assessor’s Office. 
• In Buffalo, we used repeat sales transactions data compiled by the City of Buffalo 
for us. 
• In Los Angeles and New Haven, we used repeat sales data provided by the 
Mortgage Risk Assessment Corporation (MRAC), a private data provider. 
 
In every case but Oklahoma City, the data for creation of the median price indices came 
from repeat sales data.  Generally, data ranged from the mid 1980’s to 2004 (2000 for 
MRAC data).  Since many single sales would have occurred in this period without a 
corresponding resale of the same property, the use of a repeat sales data set to create a 
median price index reduces the number of observations available compared to what 
should be available in the future.  One would expect this limitation of our analysis to 
decrease the performance of the median price indices relative to their performance when 
using a more complete dataset. 
 
In addition to the loss of single sales data, the repeat sales data was not cleaned of records 
with short holding periods.  Homes held for a short time tend to have a higher volatility 
of return, so including these sales generally reduces the measured performance of price 
indices.  If an HVP program were to exclude payouts to customers with short holding 
periods (as the Syracuse program does), one might expect the resulting effectiveness and 
efficiency to be slightly higher.  
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Repeat sales indices and median price indices represent fundamentally different 
approaches to measuring price trends.  By measuring how the same houses increase or 
decrease in value over time, the repeat sales index provides a more or less “constant 
quality” measure of the change in house prices.  By contrast, a median price index can be 
affected by changes in the composition of the homes being sold.  For example, a median 
price index for a city which experiences a wave of construction of new homes that are 
larger than existing homes would have an upward pressure on the index even if existing 
homes might not be selling for higher prices.  For this reason, repeat sales indices are 
generally considered a superior measure of home price trends.  On the other hand, most 
repeat sales indices have the issue of revisions to the index.  For example, the estimate 
produced by a repeat sales method for changes in home prices in May will be affected by 
transactions occurring in June and later months, since homes sold in those months were 
also being held in May.  Together with the earlier purchase data, the repeat sales 
determines the pace of price change in the period the property was owned, and therefore 
applies historically.  Certain repeat sales indices are subject to larger revisions problems, 
which could create logistical complications for their use in HVP programs, though terms 
could be included in an HVP program to limit the impact of revisions on actual payouts. 
 
One promising set of indices that were not tested are the FiServ/CSW ZIP code indices.  
These indices, originally designed by Case Shiller Weiss, are said to have fewer revisions 
issues than other indices (Robert Shiller, personal communication).  We might expect 
them to have greater sensitivity to localized price declines than the OFHEO index while 
being more stable than median price indices for small areas.   
 
2.3.2 Calculation of payouts vs. actual losses 
 
For each city we obtained or assembled a set of repeat sales data (i.e. that shows paired 
sales transactions for properties in the dataset).  Using this repeat sales data the actual 
gain or loss experienced by the homeowner is calculated.  Then, by looking up the value 
of a home price index for each of the two sale dates, we can calculate the gain or loss on 
the home predicted by that index.  We assume that homeowners take out an HVP policy 
for the initial purchase price of the home, so that the payout the HVP program makes to 
the homeowner is: 
 
(Percentage decline in the index) x (initial purchase price of house) 
 
2.3.3 Evaluation of index performance 
 
We evaluated the performance of alternative house price indices using several measures 
of efficacy.  These measures were developed by the Yale / Neighborhood Reinvestment 
team; below we quote from their work to define them:3 
 
The first measure of index performance is coverage effectiveness. This measures 
what fraction of a loss is covered on average (i.e. HVP payout divided by actual 
loss). Note that in calculating this measure, we do not average a payment of 
                                                 
3 Report of the Yale/Neighborhood Reinvestment Home Equity Project Group.  Yale School of Management / 
NeighborWorks® America, January 2, 2002. 
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200% to one homeowner and 0% to another and call this 100% effectiveness. 
Instead, we take the more conservative approach and only count payments that 
cover the reported loss.4  
 
The counter to effectiveness is efficiency. This measures what fraction of the 
payouts went to people who lost money on their sales. The efficiency number 
will understate the true efficiency as there will be people who appeared to make a 
profit on their sale but in fact this appreciation was due to investment in the home 
and when corrected for home improvements the person actually lost money. 
 
It will help to illustrate the direct connection between our different measures of 
performance. Consider the following Venn diagram where A + B represent the total 
losses experienced by homeowners and B + C represent the total payouts under the 
program. Thus payoffs in B are the efficient payoffs --- they go to homeowners who have 
experienced a decline in value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness  = B/(A+B)   Fraction of losses that are covered 
Efficiency  = B/(B+C) Fraction of payoff that go to individuals 
with losses. 
Loss Ratio  = (A+B)/(Purchase Prices) Fraction of value lost due to decline in real 
estate values 
Payout Ratio  = (B+C)/(Purchase Prices) Cost of paying claims, without taking 
account of administration and capital 
requirements. 
 
Mathematical Identity:  Payout Cost = Loss Ratio x Effectiveness / Efficiency  
Proof:  (B+C)/(Purchase Prices) = (A+B)/(Purchase Prices) * B/(A+B) * (B+C)/B 
 
The loss ratio is not in our control. This is determined by the market. Hence the design of 
the insurance protection can influence payout costs only through effectiveness and 
efficiency. 
 
It is tempting to assume that with “perfect” coverage, effectiveness and efficiency would 
both equal 100%. A=C=0.   However, we will always expect some distribution of home 
values around the index due to differential maintenance and transaction risks (e.g. people 
overpaying for their home or selling at too low a price).  Effectiveness of 100%, in testing 
against a real world database, would imply that the HVP program is also protecting 
                                                 
4 The effectiveness measure is weighted by the size of the loss. Thus a 100% coverage on a $10,000 loss and a 50% 
coverage on a $20,000 loss averages out to a 66.6% effectiveness ($20,000 coverage on $30,000 of losses) not 75%. 
 A B C 
Losses Payouts
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people for losses due to forces that were in their own control, so 100% effectiveness 
should not be a goal. 
 
To illustrate this point further, imagine a market that is rising.  If the market trend on 
which we are trying to protect homeowners is rising, we would not necessarily be 
concerned with effectiveness of 0 – since payouts to people in a rising market are 
probably for losses that were within their control.  Interestingly, our best measure of 
whether the market trend is rising is the index itself that we are testing. 
 
We therefore added the measure of “downward effectiveness” of the price index.  
Downward effectiveness is the measure of the effectiveness of the index in covering 
actual losses, looking only at repeat sales data for periods during which the index was 
declining.  We can similarly calculate index efficiency, loss ratio, and payout ratio 
conditioned for holding periods when the index was declining.  We further include the 
measure of “crisis effectiveness,” which we define as index effectiveness conditioned for 
holding periods when the index declined by at least 10 percent.  This “crisis” measure 
gives some sense of the performance of HVP in markets experiencing strong declines. 
 
2.4 Discussion of Results 
 
2.4.1 Historical price trends as measured by the alternative indices 
 
All of the cities studied experienced at least some price decline, as measured by their 
alternative indices.  In Los Angeles, a notable decline is observed in the first half of the 
1990’s.  In Oklahoma City, a significant decline occurs in the second half of the 1980’s.  
New Haven experiences a long, gradual decline from the late 1980s through the mid 
1990’s.  Buffalo shows only very slight declines at the MSA level. 
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It is important to note that in many cities price trend patterns look quite different as the 
level of geographic analysis changes.  Los Angeles (the largest of the cities studied) is the 
exception.  Generally, as one moves to a more detailed level of geographic analysis, the 
price trend lines become less stable and declines are more frequently observed.  Buffalo, 
where we also examined house price trends at the ZIP code level, is a particularly 
instructive example.  ZIP code level price series are very volatile with a number of ZIP 
codes experiencing sharp declines, even over periods where the MSA price series is quite 
stable.  Note also, however, that part of this volatility may be due to the greatly reduced 
number of observations.   
 
In general, these results appear to illustrate a tradeoff that has long been discussed in the 
design of indices for HVP programs.  At broad geographic levels where there is a large 
number of observations, indices perform quite stably, with the result that they are cheaper 
to provide (they only generate payouts when there is a strong, broad downwards market 
trend).  At narrower geographic levels, the indices are more volatile.  To some extent this 
volatility reflects actual home price declines that are occurring, so that these indices 
provide better protection.  A case in point is Buffalo, where conventional wisdom and 
anecdotal evidence holds that many city neighborhoods experienced significant declines, 
yet the OFHEO MSA index barely declines at all.  The tradeoff is that part of the index 
volatility for smaller geographic areas is also due to the small number of observations, 
leading to “noise” and increased payouts, even to homeowners who do not actually lose 
money.   
 
Therefore, we would generally expect broad geographic indices to have higher levels of 
efficiency and lower levels of effectiveness compared to narrow geographic indices.  This 
result becomes very clear once we look at performance numbers for the different indices.   
 
2.4.2 Performance of alternative indices 
 
Actual loss ratios from the repeat sales data show that homeowners in every city 
experienced significant losses looking over the entire period reviewed:   
 
 Loss Ratio 
Buffalo, NY 8.0%
Los Angeles, CA 10.8%
New Haven, CT 11.2%
Oklahoma City, OK 4.4%
 
How well did our alternative indices detect these losses?  We summarize the results 
below: 
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Summary table – Basic Model Overall Performance 
Basic Model OFHEO MSA Rolling Median Quarterly Median 
City Effectiveness Efficiency Effectiveness Efficiency Effectiveness Efficiency 
Buffalo, NY 0.4% 40.7% 1.4% 24.9% 3.9% 28.1%
Los Angeles, CA 26.1% 70.5% 33.2% 62.1% 35.4% 64.4%
New Haven, CT 29.0% 74.0% 24.5% 63.6% 28.3% 64.0%
Oklahoma City, OK 6.7% 63.4% 8.3% 49.0% 11.5% 22.1%
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Summary table – Downward Market Performance  
Downward Market OFHEO MSA Rolling Median Quarterly Median 
City Effectiveness Efficiency Effectiveness Efficiency Effectiveness Efficiency 
Buffalo, NY 4.7% 40.7% 18.1% 24.9% 30.6% 28.1%
Los Angeles, CA 39.2% 70.5% 43.0% 62.1% 45.6% 64.4%
New Haven, CT 37.2% 74.0% 31.4% 63.6% 33.6% 64.0%
Oklahoma City, OK 22.1% 63.4% 19.6% 49.0% 23.0% 22.1%
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The historical payout cost of providing a hedge would have varied widely, depending on 
the city and the index used: 
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Summary table – payout ratios of alternative indices (% of total home purchase value) 
 Payout Ratio 
City 
OFHEO 
MSA 
Rolling 
Median 
Quarterly 
Median 
Buffalo, NY 0.1% 0.4% 1.1%
Los Angeles, CA 4.0% 5.8% 6.0%
New Haven, CT 4.4% 4.3% 5.0%
Oklahoma City, OK 0.5% 0.8% 2.3%
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The OFHEO Index 
As expected, the OFHEO index was quite efficient.  In most of the cities it appears to be 
a worthwhile, though an imperfect hedge for home price risk.  It would also historically 
have been the cheapest index on which to provide coverage.  Note that low effectiveness 
in Oklahoma City is due to the fact that very few of the repeat sales records used for 
testing in that City were from the mid 1980’s, when the biggest price decline occurred 
there.  (Overall, the loss ratio in Oklahoma City was quite low.  Recall that in an up 
market, effectiveness will be 0).  When measuring downward effectiveness (effectiveness 
in covering losses conditioned upon the index going down), the OFHEO index 
performance improved considerably for Oklahoma City.  However, it failed to pick up 
price declines occurring in Buffalo, with effectiveness of only 0.4% and downward 
effectiveness of only 4.7% though based on the OFHEO index it would have been 
inexpensive.   
 
Citywide median price indices 
  
Citywide median price indices generally covered more of homeowner losses – the 
exception being New Haven, where the OFHEO index was somewhat more effective.  
However, the city wide median price indices were generally less efficient and would have 
resulted in a more expensive HVP program.  An interesting result was that with the 
exception of Oklahoma City, the quarterly median indices were more efficient, and in all 
cases were more effective, than rolling annual median indices.  This result may suggest 
that the seasonal cycles of the home sales market – which are ignored by a rolling annual 
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median and strongly reflected in quarterly medians – may be an important factor in the 
losses faced by homeowners. 
 
ZIP code indices 
 
We developed and tested a ZIP code rolling annual median price index for Buffalo due to 
the poor performance of  other indices there.  A rolling annual approach was necessary 
given the thinness of the data.  This index would have had effectiveness of 27.8% and 
efficiency of 36.3%, with downward effectiveness of 50.3%.  The overall payout ratio 
would have been 5.6%.  Clearly, this index would have been far superior to any of the 
other indices tested to Buffalo, although its performance was still somewhat poor 
compared to the performance of other indices in other cities.  There may be other 
formulations of indices that would work better in Buffalo, or it may simply be the case 
that for some reason there are larger idiosyncratic forces determining individual home 
price returns there. 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
No one of the price indices tested emerged as a clearly superior option for all situations.  
This result is somewhat challenging for efforts to establish a multiple city program based 
on the same index.  A program based on the OFHEO index would provide a measurable 
level of protection for customers in many situations, and would be relatively inexpensive 
to provide.  However, it would be very important for homeowners to be aware that there 
are many components of house price risk which the OFHEO index simply does not cover.  
Indices that measure house price changes in smaller geographic areas, if their efficiency 
can be improved, would be an important tool for HVP programs.  The FiServ/CSW 
repeat sales index may be one such possibility, and should be tested. 
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2.6 Data Summary 
 
 Buffalo Los Angeles New Haven Oklahoma City 
Basic Model OFHEO Roll Median 
Qtr 
Median OFHEO
Roll 
Median
Qtr 
Median OFHEO
Roll 
Median
Qtr 
Median OFHEO 
Roll 
Median
Qtr 
Median
Loss Ratio 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 11.2% 11.2% 11.2% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4%
Payout Ratio 0.1% 0.4% 1.1% 4.0% 5.8% 6.0% 4.4% 4.3% 5.0% 0.5% 0.8% 2.3%
Effectiveness 0.4% 1.4% 3.9% 26.1% 33.2% 35.4% 29.0% 24.5% 28.3% 6.7% 8.3% 11.5%
Efficiency 40.7% 24.9% 28.1% 70.5% 62.1% 64.4% 74.0% 63.6% 64.0% 63.4% 49.0% 22.1%
             
 Buffalo Los Angeles New Haven Oklahoma City 
Downward 
Market OFHEO 
Roll 
Median 
Qtr 
Median OFHEO
Roll 
Median
Qtr 
Median OFHEO
Roll 
Median
Qtr 
Median OFHEO 
Roll 
Median
Qtr 
Median
Loss Ratio 9.1% 5.3% 5.6% 18.3% 16.1% 16.6% 18.4% 15.2% 15.8% 14.5% 11.9% 8.1%
Payout Ratio 1.0% 3.8% 6.1% 10.2% 11.2% 11.8% 9.3% 7.5% 8.3% 5.1% 4.8% 8.4%
Effectiveness 4.7% 18.1% 30.6% 39.2% 43.0% 45.6% 37.2% 31.4% 33.6% 22.1% 19.6% 23.0%
Efficiency 40.7% 24.9% 28.1% 70.5% 62.1% 64.4% 74.0% 63.6% 64.0% 63.4% 49.0% 22.1%
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3.0 Capital Requirements and Pricing Requirements 
for Multiple-City Home Value Protection Programs 
3.1 Introduction 
A Home Value Protection (HVP) program has three major cost components: 
 
• The program must be able to meet the expected cost of claims.  
• The program must hold capital to pay claims in the event that price declines (and 
therefore losses) are greater than expected.  The program must meet the cost of 
holding that capital. 
• The program must pay marketing, administrative, and overhead costs. 
 
This report looks in detail at the first two of these three major cost components.  
Customers must pay the HVP program enough to meet the expected cost of claims.  They 
must also make an additional payment for the program to raise adequate capital such that 
even in the event of steep home price declines, the program can make good on its 
commitments. 
 
The advantage of a multiple-city HVP program is that since price movements in different 
cities are only partly correlated, the probability of an entire portfolio of cities having 
steep price declines is lower than the probability of any one city having a steep price 
decline.  While some cities might be experiencing a price decline, other cities could be 
increasing in value and therefore the premiums taken in from those latter cities can help 
to meet the cost of claims in the former.  This diversification should thus reduce the 
amount of capital the program must hold to meet greater than expected claims, in turn 
reducing the capital charges that consumers must bear.  A major question this paper 
explores is how much of a diversification benefit is created by increasing the number of 
cities an HVP program serves.  
3.2 Overview of the modeling approach 
To model the anticipated costs of a multiple city HVP program we used a statistical 
modeling approach where we simulated potential future home price scenarios across a 
portfolio of cities, and then determined the resulting payouts an HVP program would 
make under each of these scenarios, given certain assumptions about the rules of the 
program and homeowner behavior.  From this analysis we could then calculate the 
average premium an HVP program would need to charge, as well as the total value of 
policies it could write for any given level of capital reserves.  We tested two portfolios of 
cities, a 3-MSA simulation of Buffalo, Syracuse and New Haven (all cities that have 
expressed an interest in running an HVP program) and a 15-MSA simulation of the 
largest 15 metropolitan statistical areas (in terms of population) in the United States: 
 
New York Philadelphia Atlanta 
Los Angeles Boston Miami 
Chicago Detroit Seattle 
Washington Dallas Phoenix 
San Francisco Houston Minneapolis 
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We estimated the cost and capital requirements for providing HVP coverage on an MSA-
wide index such as the OFHEO index. 
 
The modeling approach consisted of several components: 
3.2.1 Estimation of house price path parameters and simulation of 
future price paths. 
Estimating potential future home price path movements requires a more complex 
approach than the “random walk” that could be modeled for stock prices.  Home prices 
are serially correlated, meaning that house price movements in any one quarter are 
influenced by price movements in previous quarters.  To account for this momentum we 
estimated an autoregression model in which home price movements in any one quarter 
are the function of a baseline trend, the effect of price movements in the past four 
quarters, and a random shock.   
 
To generate potential future house price paths for multiple cities, we must consider the 
degree to which home prices in different cities are partly correlated, otherwise we would 
overstate the amount of diversification provided.  We thus estimated autoregression 
parameters for the entire portfolio of cities, and then modeled the additional variance that 
individual cities could have from the movement of the portfolio. Historical price data 
from the OFHEO index was used in the regression analysis to determine the base trend, 
the amount of momentum (the size of the coefficients for each of the lag terms in the 
regression), and the size of the random shocks to home prices for each portfolio.  
 
For the 3-MSA portfolio, we estimated a portfolio equation as follows: 
 
∆P(t) = 0.00239 + 0.386961 ∆P(t-1) + 0.336149 ∆P(t-2) + 0.216229 ∆P(t-3) - 0.224059 
∆P(t-4) + ε(t) 
 
To model the additional volatility in home prices at the MSA level we assumed that 
quarterly MSA house price returns were normally distributed around the portfolio 
quarterly return.  The assumption of a normal distribution simplifies the modeling 
exercise.  However, the estimated volatility must be calibrated appropriately in order to 
provide consistent results.  Simply taking the MSA level estimated volatility will tend to 
understate the persistence of shocks and hence understate losses.  However, we know that 
the expected losses of a three city portfolio are the same as the expected losses of the 
individual cities.  Therefore, we use the estimated portfolio equation to capture the 
correlation across cities and we sue the volatility measure to calibrate the three city price 
paths to the “correct” level of losses.   
 
We adopted a similar approach for the 15 cities estimating the following portfolio 
equation: 
 
∆P(t) = 0.003717 + 0.501055 ∆P(t-1) + 0.07665 ∆P(t-2) + 0.238199 ∆P(t-3) - 0.099857 
∆P(t-4) + ε(t) 
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With the parameters in place, we then ran 1,000 simulations for both the 3-MSA and the 
15-MSA portfolios generating potential future price paths at the MSA level.  The 
simulations went out for 30 years. 
3.2.2 Estimation of insurance program payouts within the simulated 
housing market.   
The actual payouts of an HVP program depend not only on what happens to house prices, 
but also on the rules of the program, the value of the homes it protects, and how 
homeowners who purchase the product behave – particularly when they decide to move.  
We made the following assumptions: 
 
• The program was assumed to write $1,000 million of “insurance” at a constant 
rate over a five year period.  By having homeowners enroll in our simulated 
program over a period of time, the program achieved diversification not only 
across cities but also across time, thus further reducing the potential for very large 
losses.  This diversification across time is of course a feature that we would 
expect a real-world HVP program to achieve. 
• The HVP program would pay claims to homeowners equal to the amount of 
coverage purchased times the percentage drop in the simulated price index from 
the time the homeowner enrolled to the time they moved out of their home.   
• Homeowners could not make a claim in the first three years after they signed up 
for HVP (a feature of the Syracuse HVP program) 
• Homeowners moved out of their homes at a constant rate of 10 percent per year 
 
By playing out these assumptions for each of the 1,000 simulated price paths we 
calculated the total payouts the HVP program would have made as well as the present 
value of the payouts.   
 
3.2.3 Calculation of premiums and capital requirements ratios. 
The expected cost of claims for the HVP program was calculated by first calculating the 
average present value of the payouts across every simulated price path, then dividing that 
number by the total insurance written.   
 
To calculate the capital requirements ratio (i.e. the amount of initial capital investment in 
program reserves needed to write the $1 billion of insurance) we looked at the amount of 
capital needed to keep the program solvent with a 99% probability.  Given the 30 year 
horizon of the simulations, this could be interpreted as allowing the program to go 
bankrupt just once every three millennia.  Our approach was as follows: 
• We looked at the present value of losses in the 99th percentile loss scenario – 
meaning that 99 per cent of simulated price paths resulted in lower payouts and 1 
per cent of simulated price paths resulted in higher payouts. 
• We subtracted from this the present value of premiums paid as defined above. 
• The result of this calculation is the level of reserves needed to just preserve 
solvency in 99% of future scenarios. 
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3.3 Results 
The table below presents the results of the three city simulation.  
 
 3 cities individually 3 cities pooled program 
Premiums 21.6 basis points 21.3 basis points 
Required reserves $  34.0 million $ 31.6 million 
Program leverage 29.4 x 31.6 x 
 
By moving into a pooled program there is a modest benefit from increased diversification 
as the amount of insurance written for a given level of reserves increases by 7.5%.  This 
result is a substantially smaller increase than would be achieved if cities moved 
completely independently of each other.  A separate simulation suggested a 30% increase 
in insurance underwritten when moving just from one city to two cities that move 
independently of one another. 
 
The table below presents the results of the fifteen city simulation.  
 
 15 cities individually 15 cities pooled program 
Premiums 19.1 basis points 19.2 basis points 
Required reserves $  25.8 million $ 16.9 million 
Program leverage 38.7 x 59.0 x 
 
There are increased benefits from diversification in the fifteen city simulation.  In this 
case the amount of insurance written for a given level of reserves increases by more than 
50%. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Several conclusions are clear from the results detailed above: 
 
• First, the benefits of diversifying an HVP program across multiple cities is 
significant, and increase as the number of cities served increases to a more nationally 
representative portfolio.  This result is not surprising.  At the national level, house 
prices are quite stable, and house price declines historically have been limited to 
particular geographic areas rather than occurring nationwide. 
 
• The cost of providing investors with a return on the initial capital they invest is a 
significant element of HVP program costs.  The Syracuse pilot program did not have 
such a cost as the initial capital came from a federal grant.  Because diversifying to 
additional cities lowers the capital reserves requirement, it is a particularly important 
strategy to lower costs to consumers of providing HVP. 
 
• The expected cost of claims compares favorably to the expected cost of claims 
calculated in previous analyses for the City of Syracuse HVP program.  Note, 
however, that the numbers presented here are effectively an average of the effective 
cost of claims across MSAs.  To avoid adverse selection, an HVP program would 
need to vary the premium, charging higher premiums in areas where there was 
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downward price momentum or higher risk and lower premiums in areas where there 
was upwards price momentum. 
 
3.5 Limitations to the methodology 
There are several important limitations to the approach that we should note.  Future 
modeling efforts may want to do additional research to determine the impact that these 
limitations have on the modeling results. 
 
One limitation is that while we assume house price movements to be serially correlated at 
the portfolio level, we assume that the variance of MSAs around that portfolio return to 
be serially uncorrelated.  In order to avoid understating the potential for loss, we have 
calibrated this level of volatility so that total losses are consistent with individual city 
level estimates.  However, this assumption may introduce additional unforeseen sources 
of bias. 
 
A significant limitation with our analysis is that it is based on parameters estimated from 
house price movements actually observed over the past 25 years.  The future may see 
different dynamics emerge.  In particular, future price appreciation may be lower than 
historic price appreciation both due to a less inflationary environment and due to a set of 
macroeconomic conditions that is less favorable to housing.  This is a significant area for 
future research. 
 
A related caveat is that other modeling approaches could be used to generate potential 
future price paths that differ from the paths created in our simulations.  While we believe 
our simulations represent a simple and common-sense approach, they are not the only 
valid approach that could be used.  We invite others to try novel approaches (and share 
the results!). 
 
An additional area for future research is to extend the reserves analysis to a program 
providing ZIP code level coverage.  This is a relatively straightforward extension.  
However, time and budget constraints did not permit such an analysis in this project. 
 
A final limitation is that we do not know how the presence of HVP may affect 
homeowner behavior.  Were homeowner mobility patterns to differ substantially from the 
10% constant hazard rate of moving assumed, HPV program payouts could be 
significantly higher or lower than estimated losses here.  Currently, relatively few people 
move during down markets, and this “downward stickiness,” were it to persist despite the 
presence of HVP, would lower HVP payouts.  However, were there to be significant 
price declines, and these declines led to fears about the solvency of the HVP program, a 
run on the program could occur leading to serious losses.  On the other hand, homeowner 
psychology might be positively affected by the presence of HVP such that homeowners 
would stay put, and new homeowners would come in to boost the market, even in down 
markets.  This effect could be called a “virtuous circle” in which the confidence 
generated by the HVP program in and of itself reduces the potential for price declines. 
 
4- Regulatory Environment 21
4.0 Regulatory Review 
As part of an overview and introduction to the ways in which a HVP program might be 
implemented in various cities, the following regulatory scan may provide some useful 
information for those considering such a program.  The content should be considered 
informational and is not intended to provide a legal or regulatory opinion or constitute an 
exhaustive review.   
4.1 Scan of Possible Regulatory Considerations 
There are a wide range of state and federal regulations that might apply to a Home Value 
Protection (HVP) program, but since it is a newer product or concept, specifically 
applicable regulations are not easily available through a preliminary review of state and 
federal regulations.  This is due in large part to the variations in the way a HVP program 
might be set up and the different relationships it might have to underlying mortgage or 
the settlement process.  The critical question is what regulatory area HVP will fit into; – 
if considered an insurance product, insurance regulations would apply; if considered a 
derivative, securities regulations may come into play; if considered a mortgage, banking 
regulations will apply. 
 
Points 4.1.1 through 4.1.3 all apply if HVP is considered to be a mortgage. 
4.1.1 Price Level Adjusted Mortgages (PLAM)- New York State 
• There are a few references to regulations around Price Level Adjusted Mortgages 
from New York and they are excerpted and included below for reference. 
• General Regulations of the New York State Banking Board:5 § 82.1 Authorization for 
alternative mortgage instruments, Part B: “Nothing in this Part authorizes a mortgage 
loan which contains a demand feature or a mortgage loan which is structured either as 
a price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM) or a shared appreciation mortgage (SAM).” 
• Opinion Letter from Alvin A. Narin, Assistant Counsel of the NY State Banking 
Board to Elisabeth Prentice dated April 11, 2002:6 “Given the structure that you 
describe, noting in particular that the note amount and the amount of the borrower’s 
monthly payments would not be tied to the house price index, we concur that the 
[HVP] product is not akin to a PLAM, which is subject to adjustments in the 
outstanding balance.  Moreover, as you have stated that under no circumstances 
would the homeowner share with the note holder any appreciation that occurred in the 
value of the property, it would not be considered a [Shared Appreciation Mortgage] 
SAM and likewise would not be prohibited by Part 82.  Accordingly, the equity 
assurance product does not violate Part 82.” 
4.1.2 HVP Fees as Part of Closing Costs 
• Reviewing the components of the HUD-1,7 there are limited locations where HVP 
Enrollment fees might be included,8 though such inclusion may require regulatory 
                                                 
5 http://www.banking.state.ny.us/regbb82.htm 
6 http://www.banking.state.ny.us/lo020411.htm 
7 http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/sc3sectd.cfm 
8 http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/ref/sfhp2-15.cfm 
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approval.  The most likely candidate is “1300 Additional Settlement Charges.”9  
Important ramifications of including an HVP enrollment fee on the HUD-1 include: 
o Ability to finance HVP enrollment fee as a closing cost 
o Possible trigger of regulations such as HOEPA, the HomeOwner Equity 
Protection Act, if inclusion of the HVP enrollment fee into a mortgage results 
in the mortgage being classified as a “high cost loan.”  This would require a 
disclosure to the consumer, at a minimum, and might also trigger other 
regulatory restrictions. 
4.1.3 Federal Preemption 
• Federal Preemption could play a role in the regulatory implementation of a HVP 
program, particularly if it were pursued across multiple states.  While individual state 
regulations may be manageable through discussions with state regulators, such 
overriding guidance would be beneficial for a program across multiple states.   
• There are a variety of issues surrounding the federal preemption of state laws, and it 
is not possible to predict how such a federal override might apply, because the effect 
is dependent on the language of the federal regulation.   
• Some of this uncertainty involving federal preemption is evident in recent federal 
preemption of state powers to regulate banks.10 
4.1.4 Other Potential Regulatory Issues: 
• Securities laws.  If HVP is defined to be a security, there will be securities regulations 
that may require certain disclosures about the product and its offerers.  Sellers of the 
product might have to be registered securities brokers.  The Syracuse HVP project 
obtained a legal opinion that their product did not constitute a security. 
• Insurance laws.  If HVP is insurance, different state regulations may impact whether 
and how it can be offered.  New York State, for instance, has a prohibition on the 
provision of “financial guarantee insurance,” into which category HVP may fall.  In 
Connecticut, financial guarantee insurance must be provided by a monoline insurance 
company, meaning that HVP products could not be integrated into the product line of 
a Property & Casualty insurance business. 
4.1.5 Potential Product Offerings 
• A HVP product could be offered in a number of ways that may have different 
regulatory implications.  There are two main questions involving the establishment of 
an HVP program:  
o Who holds the risk? 
 For-profit: Insurance, reinsurance, or mortgage insurance companies, 
mortgage companies, diversified financial institutions 
 Non-profit: National or local government or community development 
organization. 
o Who or how is the product offered, distributed, and paid for? 
 Stand alone product- paid for inside or outside of settlement costs 
 Integrated into Mortgage 
                                                 
9 http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/sc3secta.cfm 
10 http://www.realtor.org/PublicAffairsWeb.nsf/Pages/VotersOpposeBankRegs?OpenDocument 
4- Regulatory Environment 23
 Offered through insurers, real estate agents, settlement companies, etc. 
• HVP as Stand Alone Product 
o Distinct Transaction 
o Easy to purchase at any time, either around closing or years later, increasing 
the number of potentially interested homeowners.   
o Similar to Syracuse but with for profit entities 
• HVP Product Integrated with Mortgage 
o Possibly lower mortgage rate on high LTV loans (insured collateral) 
o Possible reduction in mortgage costs and easier to finance HVP fees as part of 
loan. 
o Possibly lower mortgage insurance requirement.  Theoretically, the presence 
of HVP reduces the amount of risk of default on the mortgage, and would 
suggest a reduction of MI insurance rates when HVP is present.  If a firm were 
to offer both HVP and MI, that firm could manage both premiums. 
o Possible concepts to connect HVP with mortgage: 
 HVP premium paid as points at closing 
 HVP premium paid by 3rd party – Lender, Mortgage Insurer, etc. 
 HVP premium capitalized into mortgage and included in loan amount 
 Payoff/Claim could automatically adjust mortgage amount downward 
• HVP Integrated with Mortgage Insurance (MI) 
o Perhaps complimentary to regular MI in that HVP specifically insures the 
value of the underlying asset, while MI generally insures underlying value and 
risk of non-payment. 
o By distinguishing different risks, pricing could more accurately reflect risk. 
o While the presence of HVP might lower the traditional MI, the two together 
would cost more than MI alone. 
o Possibly lower mortgage insurance premium (less risk to insurer) 
• Pricing Considerations with any retail application.  Premium as up front fee, annual 
premium, or blend 
o Syracuse program uses an up-front fee only.   
o If blended, up front fee could be reduced, making product more attractive. 
o Possibility of dynamic annual premium pricing. 
o If some form of annual premium were used, it would increase the concern of 
adverse selection, where only homeowners in down markets would stay in the 
program.  Any effects of adverse selection would need to be incorporated into 
any annual premium, but upfront fees would be more straightforward. 
• Potential Secondary HVP Product Applications 
o HVP Incorporated into a shared appreciation product which let borrowers 
access lower rates and payments in exchange for sharing with their lenders part of 
the appreciation in value their properties experience. 
o HVP as a product for Lenders or Mortgage Insurers.  In December 2004, the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange announced plans “to explore the development 
of derivatives based on the Fiserv, CSW, (CSW) family of Housing Price 
Indexes (HPI).”11  Such an exchange could provide a market for HVP related 
products for more sophisticated participants.   
o HVP similar to Syracuse Program 
                                                 
11 http://www.cme.com/about/press/cn/04-188HousingIndex10813.html 
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4.2 Representative State Regulators 
For reference, the following section contains information for the state regulators of the 
cities included in the preceding section on index analysis. 
4.2.1 New York State Department of Taxation and Finance12 
• Contact Information 
o NYS Department of Taxation and Finance 
o W.A. Harriman Campus, Albany, NY  12227 
• Divisions 
o Office of Counsel  (518) 457-2153 or (518) 457-2070 
o Office of Tax Enforcement  (800) 225-5829 
o Office of the Deputy Inspector General (518) 457-3775 
4.2.2 New York State Housing Finance Agency13 
• The New York State Housing Finance Agency’s (“HFA”) goal is to provide 
affordable mortgages to private and non-profit developers.  To accomplish this goal, 
HFA lends the proceeds of various taxable and non-taxable bonds. 
• Contact Information 
o 107 Delaware Avenue, Suite 620, Buffalo, NY 14202, (716) 853-1548 
4.2.3 New York State Banking Department14 
• The New York State Banking Department is the primary regulator for financial 
institutions operating in New York, including mortgage bankers and brokers. 
• Contact Information 
o Superintendent of Banks, One State Street, New York, NY  10004-1417 
• Divisions 
o Community and Regional Banks Division - Supervises community focused 
domestic commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and 
holding companies for the aforementioned institutions. In addition, supervises 
credit unions, safe deposit companies and thrift institution-sponsored charitable 
foundations.   
Deputy Superintendent: Manuel Kursky15 - (212) 709-1610 
o Mortgage Banking Division - Responsible for the supervision of entities involved 
in the residential mortgage business who handle property located in New York 
State, including licensed mortgage bankers and registered mortgage brokers. Also 
handles resolution of all written mortgage-related consumer complaints. 
Deputy Superintendent: Kenneth Bielemeier16 - (212) 709-5540 
• Background 
o Community development17 is defined as:  
 Affordable housing (including multifamily rental housing) for low- or moderate-income individuals;  
                                                 
12 http://www.tax.state.ny.us 
13 http://www.nyhomes.org/hfa/hfa.html 
14 http://www.banking.state.ny.us 
15 manuel.kursky@banking.state.ny.us 
16 ken.bielemeier@banking.state.ny.us 
17 http://www.banking.state.ny.us/crafaq.htm#q6 
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 Community services targeted to low- or moderate-income individuals;  
 Activities that promote economic development by financing businesses or farms that meet the size eligibility 
standards of the Small Business Administration's Development Company or Small Business Investment Company 
programs or have gross annual revenues of $1 million or less;  
 Activities that revitalize or stabilize low- or moderate-income geographies; or  
 Activities that prevent defaults and/or foreclosures in loans made pursuant to (1) and (3), of this subdivision (See 
Part 76 of the General Regulations of the Banking Board).  
o An institution receives favorable consideration for those activities that have a 
primary purpose of community development. Although primary purpose is not 
defined in the regulation, it is presumed to mean that a majority of the activities 
engaged in by the beneficiary of the bank’s support, meet the regulatory definition 
of community development. Community development support may take the form 
of community development loans, qualified investments (including grants), or 
community development services. 
4.2.4 Connecticut Department of Banking18 
• Contact Information19 
o 260 Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103-1800 
o John P. Burke,20 Banking Commissioner (860) 240-8100 
• Divisions 
o Consumer Credit Division,21 260 Constitution Plaza, Hartford, CT 06103-1800 
(860) 240-8200 or (800) 831-7225 
Alan J. Cicchetti,22 Deputy Commissioner 
William Nahas, Jr.,23 Division Director 
o Financial Institutions Division,24 260 Constitution Plaza, Hartford, CT 06103 
(860) 240-8180 or (800) 831-7225 
Mary Ellen O'Neill,25 Division Director 
o Securities and Business Investments Division,26 260 Constitution Plaza, Hartford, 
CT 06103, (860) 240-8230 or (800) 831-7225 
Ralph A. Lambiase,27 Division Director 
• Background 
o The mission of the Department of Banking is to protect users of financial services 
from unlawful or improper practices by requiring that regulated entities and 
individuals adhere to the law, assuring the safety and soundness of state chartered 
banks and credit unions, educating and communicating with the public and other 
stakeholders, and promoting cost-efficient and effective regulation. 
4.2.5 Connecticut Insurance Department28 
• Contact Information 
                                                 
18 http://www.state.ct.us/dob/ 
19 http://www.state.ct.us/dob/pages/travel.htm 
20 john.burke@ct.gov 
21 http://www.state.ct.us/dob/pages/ccdiv.htm 
22 alan.cicchetti@ct.gov 
23 william.nahas@ct.gov 
24 http://www.state.ct.us/dob/pages/fininst.htm 
25 mary.oneill@ct.gov 
26 http://www.state.ct.us/dob/pages/secdiv.htm 
27 ralph.lambiase@ct.gov 
28 http://www.ct.gov/cid/site/default.asp 
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o State of Connecticut Insurance Department, 153 Market Street, Hartford, CT 
06103, Mailing address: P.O. Box 816, Hartford CT 06142-0816 
(860) 297-3800 or (800) 203-3447 (CT Only) 
• Selected Divisions 
o Consumer Affairs Division29,30 (860)297-3900 or (800) 203-3447 
Raymond T. Claytor, Director 
o Financial Regulation Division31,32 (860)297-3814 or (800) 203-3447 
Kathryn Belfi, Chief Examiner, Financial Analysis & Compliance 
James Gorman, Chief Examiner, Financial Examination 
John Purple, Chief Actuary 
o Market Conduct Division33,34 (860)297-3848 or (800) 203-3447 
Daniel Harrigan, Program Manager 
o Property & Casualty Division35,36 (860) 297-3867 or (860) 297-3913 
George B. Bradner, Director 
Judith Thibodeau, Principal Examiner 
4.2.6 California State Treasury37 
• Contact Information38 
o Post Office Box 942809, 915 Capitol Mall C-15, Sacramento, CA 94209-0001 
o Housing and Community Development (“HCD”) Contact List39 
• Divisions 
o Investments - Dan Dowell,40 Director - (916) 653-3147 
o Securities Management - Francisco Lujano,41 Director - (916) 653-4386 
• Background 
o Community Affairs42 - HCD administers more than 20 programs that award loans 
and grants for the construction, acquisition, rehabilitation and preservation of 
affordable rental and ownership housing, homeless shelters and transitional 
housing, public facilities and infrastructure, and the development of jobs for lower 
income workers. Please note that, with rare exceptions, these loans and grants are 
not made to individuals, but to local public agencies, nonprofit and for-profit 
housing developers, and service providers. In many cases these agencies then 
provide funds to individual end users. 
                                                 
29 http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?a=1272&Q=254350&cidPNavCtr=|#39394 
30 ctinsdept.consumeraffairs@po.state.ct.us 
31 http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?a=1261&Q=254414&cidPNavCtr=|#39398 
32 ctinsdept.financial@po.state.ct.us 
33 http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?a=1268&Q=254584&cidPNavCtr=|#39395 
34 ctinsdept.marketconduct@po.state.ct.us 
35 http://www.ct.gov/cid/cwp/view.asp?a=1271&Q=254646&cidPNavCtr=|#39393 
36 ctinsdept.propcasualty@po.state.ct.us  
37 http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/ 
38 http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/inside/directory.htm 
39 http://www.hcd.ca.gov/contact.html 
40 ddowell@treasurer.ca.gov 
41 flujano@treasurer.ca.gov 
42 http://www.hcd.ca.gov/ca 
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4.2.7 California Department of Financial Institutions43 
• Contact Information44 
o 111 Pine Street, Suite 1100, San Francisco, CA 94111-5613, (415) 263-8500 
300 S. Spring Street, Suite 15513, Los Angeles, CA 90013-1204, (213) 897-2085 
1810 13th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814, (916) 322-5966 
7575 Metropolitan Drive, Suite 108, San Diego, CA 92108, (619) 682-7227  
• Selected Divisions 
o Laws and Regulations45 
o Consumer Services46 
o Licensee Services47 
4.2.8 California Department of Corporations48 
• Mortgage lenders, mortgage bankers, brokers-dealers and investment advisors are 
licensed by the Department of Corporations 
• Contact Information49 (866) 275-2677 or 866 ASK CORP 
o 320 West 4th Street, Suite 750, Los Angeles, CA 90013-2344, (213) 576-7500  
71 Stevenson Street, Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA 94105-2980, (415) 972-8559 
1515 K Street, Suite 200, Sacramento, CA  95814-4052, (916) 445-7205 
1350 Front St., Room 2034, San Diego, CA 92101-3697, (619) 525-4233 
• Divisions 
o Securities Regulation Division50 
o Financial Services Division51 
4.2.9 California Department of Insurance52 
• Contact Information53 
o Consumer Communications Bureau, 300 South Spring Street, South Tower, Los 
Angeles, CA 90013, 800-927-HELP (4357) or (213) 897-8921 
• Divisions 
o Consumer54 
o Industry55 
4.2.10 Texas Department of Banking56 
• Contact Information57 
                                                 
43 http://www.dfi.ca.gov/ 
44 http://www.dfi.ca.gov/contact/ 
45 http://www.dfi.ca.gov/lawsreg/ 
46 http://www.dfi.ca.gov/consumer/ 
47 http://www.dfi.ca.gov/licensee/ 
48 http://www.corp.ca.gov/ 
49 http://www.corp.ca.gov/contactus/contact.htm 
50 http://www.corp.ca.gov/srd/security.htm 
51 http://www.corp.ca.gov/fsd/financial.htm 
52 http://www.insurance.ca.gov/ 
53 http://www.insurance.ca.gov/docs/FS-Contacts.htm 
54 http://www.insurance.ca.gov/docs/FS-Consumer.htm 
55 http://www.insurance.ca.gov/docs/FS-Insurer.htm 
56 http://www.banking.state.tx.us 
57 http://www.banking.state.tx.us/wdicf.htm 
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o 2601 North Lamar Boulevard, Austin, Texas 78705-4294, (512) 475-1300 
• Divisions 
o Executive Division – Participates in the supervision and regulation of state banks, 
trust companies, and state-licensed foreign bank agencies, and the administration 
and enforcement of laws. 
Randall S. James,58 Commissioner - (512) 475-1325 
o Finance Commission of Texas59 - The Finance Commission is responsible for 
overseeing and coordinating the Texas Department of Banking, the Savings and 
Loan Department, and the Office of the Consumer Credit Commissioner and 
serves as the primary point of accountability for ensuring that state depository and 
lending institutions function as a system, considering the broad scope of the 
financial services industry. 
• Background 
o Housing Strategies - For 2005-2006, the Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs (“TDHCA”) proposes an increase in the state’s appropriation 
to the Housing Trust Fund (“HTF”) and creation of a dedicated funding source for 
the program. The agency also seeks to expand public support of credit counseling 
programs.  
4.2.11 Oklahoma State Banking Department60 
• The Department regulates state-charted banks, credit unions, savings and loans, and 
trust companies as well as cemeteries and money order companies. 
• Contact Information61 
o 4545 North Lincoln Boulevard, Suite 164, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 
o (405) 521-2782 
• Divisions 
o State Banking Board 
o State Credit Union Board 
o Savings & Loan Advisory Council 
o Examinations Staff 
4.2.12 Oklahoma State Housing Finance Agency62 
• The mission of Oklahoma Housing Finance Agency is to provide affordable housing 
resources. OHFA is the state's largest provider of affordable housing, offering nine 
housing programs ranging from a homeless program and rental assistance to housing 
development and home ownership. 
• Contact Information 
o 100 NW 63rd Street, Suite 200, Oklahoma City, OK 73116, (405) 848-1144  
• Divisions 
o Rental Assistance – The program provides assistance to more than 9,000 low-
income families at a cost of $42 million dollars a year. 
Deborah Jenkins, Team Leader 
                                                 
58 randall.james@banking.state.tx.us 
59 http://www.fc.state.tx.us/Home Equity/HEINDEX.HTM 
60 http://www.osbd.state.ok.us 
61 http://www.osbd.state.ok.us/Personnel/personne.htm 
62 http://www.ohfa.org 
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o Finance – Responsible for all state housing finance related functions. 
Eldon Overstreet, Team Leader 
o Housing Development – Responsible for implementing the Housing Tax Credits 
Program, HOME Program, Trust Fund and OHFA Advantage bond program 
John Marshall, Team Leader 
4.2.13 Oklahoma Insurance Department63 
• The department assures that consumers have available a solvent insurance market, a 
well-educated industry from which to purchase insurance, and by providing high-
quality policyholder service and education. 
• Contact Information 
o 2401 N.W. 23rd, Suite 28, P.O. Box 53408, Oklahoma City, OK 73152-3408 
o (800) 522-0071 
• Divisions 
o Comptroller – Shantha Varahan64 (405) 522-4622 
o Financial – John Beers,65 Director (405) 521-3966 
o Legal – Michael Ridgeway,66 Director/General Counsel (405) 521-2746 
 
                                                 
63 http://www.oid.state.ok.us/index.htm 
64 shanthavarahan@insurance.state.ok.us 
65 johnbeers@insurace.state.ok.us 
66 michaelridgeway@insurance.state.ok.us 
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4.3 Federal Regulators 
The following section reviews some of the federal entities that might play a role in a 
multi state HVP program.  
4.3.1 Securities Exchange Commission67 
• The primary mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is to 
protect investors and maintain the integrity of the securities markets.  The SEC 
requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to 
the public, which provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to 
judge for themselves if a company's securities are a good investment.  The SEC also 
oversees other key participants in the securities world, including stock exchanges, 
broker-dealers, investment advisors, mutual funds, and public utility holding 
companies. The SEC is concerned primarily with promoting disclosure of important 
information, enforcing the securities laws, and protecting investors who interact with 
these various organizations and individuals.  
4.3.2 U.S. Treasury Department68 
• The Department of the Treasury is the primary federal agency responsible for the 
economic and financial prosperity and security of the United States, and as such is 
responsible for a wide range of activities including advising the President on 
economic and financial issues, promoting the President’s growth agenda, and 
enhancing corporate governance in financial institutions. 
4.3.3 Office of Management and Budget69 
• The Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB’s”) predominant mission is to assist 
the President in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and to supervise its 
administration in Executive Branch agencies. In helping to formulate the President's 
spending plans, OMB evaluates the effectiveness of agency programs, policies, and 
procedures, assesses competing funding demands among agencies, and sets funding 
priorities. OMB ensures that agency reports, rules, testimony, and proposed 
legislation are consistent with the President's Budget and with Administration 
policies. In addition, OMB oversees and coordinates the Administration's 
procurement, financial management, information, and regulatory policies. In each of 
these areas, OMB's role is to help improve administrative management, to develop 
better performance measures and coordinating mechanisms, and to reduce any 
unnecessary burdens on the public.  
4.3.4 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development70 
• The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD's”) mission is to 
increase homeownership, support community development and increase access to 
affordable housing free from discrimination. To fulfill this mission, HUD will 
embrace high standards of ethics, management and accountability and forge new 
                                                 
67 http://www.sec.gov 
68 http://www.treas.gov 
69 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb 
70 http://www.hud.gov 
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partnerships--particularly with faith-based and community organizations--that 
leverage resources and improve HUD's ability to be effective on the community level.  
4.3.5 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight71 
• The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight’s (“OFHEO's”) primary mission 
is ensuring the capital adequacy and financial safety and soundness of two 
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) -- the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”). 
4.3.6 Federal Housing Finance Board72 
• The Federal Housing Finance Board regulates the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks 
(“FHLBanks”) that were created in 1932 to improve the supply of funds to local 
lenders that, in turn, finance loans for home mortgages. The board also has regulatory 
authority and supervisory oversight responsibility for the Office of Finance.  The 
Finance Board ensures that the FHLBanks, which are privately capitalized, 
government-sponsored enterprises, operate in a safe and sound manner, carry out 
their housing and community development finance mission, and remain adequately 
capitalized and able to raise funds in the capital markets. 
4.3.7 Federal Reserve System73 
• The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the United States. Congress 
created the Federal Reserve charging it with a responsibility to foster a sound banking 
system and a healthy economy. This remains, today, the broad mission of the Fed and 
its component parts: the 12 Federal Reserve Banks nationwide, each serving a 
specific region of the country; and the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C., 
established to oversee the Fed System. 
4.3.8 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency74 
• The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) charters, regulates, and 
supervises all national banks. It also supervises the federal branches and agencies of 
foreign banks.  The OCC’s nationwide staff of examiners conducts on-site reviews of 
national banks and provides sustained supervision of bank operations. The agency 
issues rules, legal interpretations, and corporate decisions concerning banking, bank 
investments, bank community development activities, and other aspects of bank 
operations.  The OCC’s activities are predicated on four objectives that support the 
OCC’s mission to ensure a stable and competitive national banking system. The four 
objectives are:  
o To ensure the safety and soundness of the national banking system.  
o To foster competition by allowing banks to offer new products and services.  
o To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of OCC supervision, including 
reducing regulatory burden.  
o To ensure fair and equal access to financial services for all Americans.  
                                                 
71 http://www.ofheo.gov 
72 http://www.fhfb.gov 
73 http://www.federalreserve.gov 
74 http://www.occ.gov 
4- Regulatory Environment 32
 
4.4 Knowledgeable Industry Experts  
4.4.1 Elisabeth Prentice75 
• NeighborWorks America 
• Involved with Syracuse Home Value Protection program and the current research. 
4.4.2 Eric Hangen76 
• President, I Squared Community Development 
• Involved with Syracuse Home Value Protection program and the current research. 
4.4.3 Tom Skinner77 
• Managing Director, RedBrick Partners 
• Responsible for finance, research, and investment strategy 
• Ten years of experience in real estate economics and new product development 
• Involved with Syracuse Home Value Protection program and the current research. 
4.4.4 Robert Schiller78 
• Stanley B. Resor Professor of Economics, Yale University 
 
 
 
 
See also section 1.7.2 Related Organizations and URLs for additional information. 
 
                                                 
75 BPrentice@nw.org 
76 ehangen@i2community.org 
77 tskinner@redbrickpartners.com 
78 robert.shiller@yale.edu 
